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Abstract
Tanzanian novelist and philosopher Euphrase Kezilahabi strives to “dis-
mantle the resemblance of language to the world” (1985: 216) through
challenging the fundamental philosophical dichotomy of subject and
object. The result of this dismantling will be a new “language whose foun-
dation is Being” (Kezilahabi 1991: 69; lugha ambayo msingi wake ni
kuwako). This is an expression of a new relationship between humanity
and Being built on a holistic epistemology of experience and embodiment.
Through “kuwako”, Kezilahabi expresses in Swahili the Heideggerian
concept of Sein (Being). His adherence to Heidegger, however, puts him
at risk of compromising the very foundation of his own philosophy: his
continued critique of essentialism. This article argues that Kezilahabi sal-
vages his concept of “kuwako” from these essentialist pitfalls precisely
through his declared “destructive rather than deconstructive stand vis-à-
vis the Western philosophy of value and representation” (Kezilahabi
1985: 4). The destruction is implemented on the thematic level: a phase
of “vurumai” (chaos) which destroys previous traditions of philosophy is
staged in Nagona. However, translation is an even more powerful device
to carry out this destruction: “kuwako” is not an innocent reiteration but a
radical reformulation of Heidegger’s central philosophical concept,
decisively informed by Kezilahabi’s lifelong propensity for existentialism.
Keywords: Euphrase Kezilahabi, Martin Heidegger, Hermeneutics of
translation, Swahili literature, African epistemology
1. Introduction: Nagona and Mzingile
“Texts that impede Swahili literature.” Such was the verdict of prominent liter-
ary critic Mwenda Mbatiah (see Tchokothe 2014: 141) about the two novels pro-
duced by the famous Tanzanian writer, Euphrase Kezilahabi, in the early 1990s.
Lacking an elaborate plot, the two narratives follow a meandering male protag-
onist through unknown, hostile landscapes, collapsing time and questioning
such basic ontological concepts as unity, identity, or causality. Kezilahabi’s dra-
matic literary turn, introducing these radical stylistic and thematic innovations,
launched what has come to be known as the “new Swahili novel” (Gromov
2014: 40). After Nagona (proper name, 1990) and Mzingile (Labyrinth,
1991), several authors followed suit and published similarly enigmatic, although
rarely comparably philosophically profound, novels: “fiction that challenges the
customary ontological boundaries of a hitherto ‘broadly’ realist mainstream
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tradition” (Khamis 2005: 92). The “new Swahili novel” broadly converges with
postmodernist writing in the West, but it maintains distinct features of post-
colonial literature, both in its style and in its political commitment (Rettová
2016a; 2016b): Swahili writers draw on “indigenous” ontologies (introducing
spirits, zombies, using metamorphoses between animals and humans, etc.);
they employ narrative techniques derived from the oral tradition (using
circular plots, specific topoi, settings, styles of characterization, etc.); and
they critique manifestations of the political and intellectual hegemony of the
West.
But Nagona and Mzingile are not only literary innovations. They are in fact a
literary implementation of Kezilahabi’s philosophy, elaborated five years earlier
in his doctoral thesis “African philosophy and the problem of literary interpret-
ation” (1985). In the Swahili novels, Kezilahabi puts into literary practice the
ideas projected in the thesis, but arguably he goes one step further in being
more radical in his criticism of Western philosophy.
In several passages in these two novels, Kezilahabi translates Western philo-
sophical concepts into Swahili. For instance, in discussions with a scientist who
tries to change the order of nature, the main protagonist (who is also the
first-person narrator of most of the chapters) summarizes:
Baada ya hapo tulikuwa na majadiliano makali kuhusu umuhimu wa vuru-
mai katika fikra, na ulazima wa kuvunja uhusiano uliopo kati ya Mtu na
Kitu (Kezilahabi 1991: 52).
After that we had incisive discussions concerning the importance of chaos in
thought and the need to break the relationship that exists between Man and
Thing.1
The capitalized words Mtu (“Man”) and Kitu (“Thing”) are Kezilahabi’s Swahili
renditions of “subject” and “object”. This becomes clear from similar passages
in his doctoral thesis, where he writes:
[A]n ontological approach [to literature] goes beyond categories of
Subject/Object. (. . .) The African onto-critic (. . .) has to avoid the tragic
epistemology of Western man (Kezilahabi 1985: 215–9).
The same concepts are evoked again in a passage at the end of Mzingile where
the main protagonist discusses the arrangement of a future, post-apocalyptic
world with a mysterious woman with a shining body:
“Sasa nafikiri yafaa tuanzishe lugha mpya”, nilitoa wazo.
“Nami pia nimekuwa nikifikiria wazo hilo. Tutahitaji lugha ambayo haina
cha Mtu na Kitu.”
“Yafaa pia lugha hiyo isiwe na maneno kama ‘nyuklia’ au ‘vita’. Tutaunda
lugha ambayo msingi wake ni kuwako.” (Kezilahabi 1991: 69.)
1 All translations in this article are mine, unless indicated otherwise.
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“Now, I think we should create a new language”, I voiced a thought.
“I have been thinking of that, too. We will need a language that does not
contain the issue of Man and Thing.”
“This language should also not contain words like ‘nuclear’ and ‘war’. We
shall create a language whose foundation is being.”
Another concept appears here, kuwako (“being”), which is Kezilahabi’s transla-
tion of the Heideggerian “Being”, a concept which, again, appears many times
in Kezilahabi’s thesis:
. . . Language is more than a signifying system. Language is the “house of
Being”. By writing in foreign languages we allow the Western world to be
the center of value of our Being (Kezilahabi 1985: 359).
The Heideggerian provenance of this concept in Kezilahabi’s thesis is undeniable.
In this passage, he capitalizes “Being”, following the usus of translating the con-
cept into English, and the passage also contains an (unacknowledged) direct quota-
tion of Heidegger: “Language is the house of being” (Heidegger 1998: 239).
Through these words Kezilahabi expresses in Swahili central concepts of
Western philosophy: the concepts of subject and object and, in particular, the
Heideggerian concept of Sein (Being). Together with Marx and Nietzsche,
Heidegger is one of the three Western philosophers who have informed the
philosophical project Kezilahabi develops in his doctoral dissertation, and
“Being” becomes one of his key concepts.
Kezilahabi’s philosophical project
In his thesis Kezilahabi says the African literary critic “has to take a destructive
rather than a deconstructive stand vis-à-vis the Western philosophy of value and
representation” (Kezilahabi 1985: 4). This will help it to prevent African experi-
ence from being “objectified and reduced to a body of knowledge that signifies”
(Kezilahabi 1985: 194) in that the critic captures “the ontological aspect of
metaphor, symbol and ritual” (1985: 215).
For Kezilahabi, the “tragic epistemology of Western man” (1985: 219), consist-
ing in the deadly split of the totality of being into “the categories of Subject/Object”
(Kezilahabi 1985: 215), is manifested in the view of literature as representation, and
Kezilahabi strives to challenge this view of literature through “dismantl[ing] the
resemblance of language to the world” (1985: 216). His two experimental novels
in Swahili, Nagona andMzingile, are a result of this theoretical argument. The dis-
mantling of the resemblance of language to the world is done in the two novels both
on the level of style: through the employment of a non-linear, meandering plot;
through lackof temporal and spatial coherence, a radical disruptionof habitual ontol-
ogy, etc.; andon the level of discourse: in several places, especially in the final scenes
of Mzingile, the protagonists discuss the creation of a new “language” as a way to
heal the deadly fractures of epistemology: they plan to “create a language whose
foundation is being” (Kezilahabi 1991: 69). This is a projection of a new relationship
between humanity and being on the foundation of a holistic epistemology.
The radical rejection of the distinction between subject and object is at the
basis of Kezilahabi’s project of writing. He dubs this project “onto-criticism”
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as an approach to African literature which is superior to “techno-criticism”: the
criticism of African literature as done by foreign critics incapable of deep her-
meneutical insights into African being. Through “onto-criticism” Kezilahabi
aspires to destroy the semblance of language and the world, which he sees as
just another instance of the subject-object relationship, and the idea of seeing lit-
erature as a body that represents, that reflects the world:
The onto-critic is engaged in the liberation of words from conventions, and
seeks to displace and decenter logocentrism and signification by making
relations empty of meaning and by dismantling the resemblance of lan-
guage to the world. . . . To an onto-critic . . . literature is not a reorganiza-
tion of impulses but an ontological understanding that is projective.
(Kezilahabi 1985: 217–8.)
He is seeking an alternative model of literature challenging the theory of litera-
ture as mimesis.
The abolition of the split between subject and object can be understood in
several ways, in addition to the ontological reading of literature. Lanfranchi sug-
gests the idea of intuition: “a notion of reason that is intuitive and emphatic”
(2015: 177). This comes close to Husserl’s insistence on the role of intuition
in knowledge. However, for Husserl, intuition is firmly rooted within the con-
fines of the subject-object dichotomy. Senegalese poet, philosopher, and polit-
ician Léopold Sédar Senghor offers another reading of the non-separation of
subject and object as embodiment, similarly to mimesis in art. Mimesis is still
a reproduction of the world, but it is a holistic experience from the perspective
of the knowing subject. Senghor’s “dancing the other” (Senghor 1995) suggests
a theory of art and literature as embodied and lived. Yet it is not projective but
reproductive: it mirrors lived life. A philosophy of embodiment is therefore not
sufficient for Kezilahabi as it does not account for the projective element in lit-
erature for its creative freedom.
The abandonment of the subject-object dichotomy implies knowledge which
does not go via the conscious mind as cogito and via textual (linguistic)
representation. Kezilahabi speaks of “sensibility, attunement, immersion and
meditation without an intermediary or articulated discourse” (1985: 219). For
a literary project, there is an obvious contradiction: how can literature transcend
“articulated discourse”, beyond the most banal (cf. Kezilahabi’s poem “Pa!”,
Kezilahabi 2008: 60; see also Gaudioso 2014: 93)? If Kezilahabi challenges
the referentiality of language in literature, what is then literature beyond referen-
tiality? The new language in fact abolishes the whole structure of signification.
Instead of replicating reality through representation, the writer should instead
“let truth be by privileging the silent language of Being” (Kezilahabi 1985: 2).
What does this mean? What role does “Being” have in Kezilahabi’s philosophy?
How is “Being” related to the project of writing in freedom and being creative
through writing?
“Being” is a concept of Heideggerian origin: “In Heidegger’s thought, ‘man’
is the privileged channel of expression of ‘being’ (Sein) in his existential consti-
tution as Dasein (there-Being) and in his use of art and language – especially
poetic language – through which being is disclosed” (Lanfranchi 2015: 178 f.).
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Heidegger’s romanticist philosophy advocating the abandonment of reason
becomes integral to Kezilahabi’s project. But here Kezilahabi has entered a dan-
gerous terrain. His reliance on Heidegger leads to problematic links to essential-
ism which are contradictory to Kezilahabi’s own criticism of essentialism.
Kezilahabi profiles himself as a strong critic of essentialism throughout his doc-
toral thesis:
Africa has been plagued with philosophies of origin. In the Western world
this very philosophy culminated in Nazi Germany, and we know the con-
sequences of this philosophy. The oldest is not necessarily the nearest to
our true Being, neither does it have a mandate to rule the present. It
does not greatly matter whether we are the real true heirs to the “Stolen
legacy”. What matters is what we are. A philosophy of origins is a
Fascist enterprise. Philosophies of origins are another error. (Kezilahabi
1985: 357–8, emphasis added.)
This article identifies the tensions between Heidegger’s philosophy and
Kezilahabi’s incisive critique of the “philosophies of origin” as essentialist philo-
sophies and ideologies that have been adopted by Africans to the detriment of
the continent’s prosperity and development. The reliance on Heidegger effect-
ively puts Kezilahabi at risk of compromising the very foundations of his philo-
sophical project.
However, the article also argues that Kezilahabi salvages his concept of
kuwako (being) from these essentialist pitfalls precisely through his declared
project of “tak[ing] a destructive rather than a deconstructive stand vis-à-vis
the Western philosophy of value and representation” (Kezilahabi 1985: 4).
Having passed the phase of vurumai (“chaos”; in the novels, a chaotic philo-
sophical dance that destroys millions of people), kuwako crucially reformulates
and redefines Heidegger’s central philosophical concept and comes to reflect
Kezilahabi’s anti-essentialist stance. I further argue that the ultimate destruction
is effectuated through the act of translation. In its new linguistic form, kuwako
acquires a strongly existentialist meaning.
2. Kezilahabi and Heidegger
Heidegger is one of Kezilahabi’s “eye-openers” (1985: 5–6): one of three philo-
sophers who “lay bare the nature of the Western world” (1985: 5); the other two
are Marx and Nietzsche.2 The strong influence of Heidegger on Kezilahabi is
2 Criticizing Kezilahabi’s essentialism, visible in the stark “Africa/the West” dichotomy,
Gaudioso demonstrates that these thinkers were in no way alone in Western philosophy:
“Heidegger and Nietzsche are not isolated figures, but rather . . . one part of Western phil-
osophy was used to challenge and reform another part. This makes impossible the
dichotomic essentialism professed by Kezilahabi” (Gaudioso forthcoming). Lanfranchi
(2012; 2015) is also critical of Kezilahabi’s simplistic and essentialist view of Western
philosophy. Not least because of this simplification, Kezilahabi’s ambition to depart
from Western philosophy is compromised: in his thesis, he pits two trends of Western
philosophy against one another and reinterprets one as being uniquely “African”. A
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evident in Kezilahabi’s adoption of the concept of “Being”; this shows in many
ways in his statements about the relationship between language and Being; in his
belief that Being is disclosed through poetic language; or in his concept of
“ontology”. His thesis teems with both direct and indirect quotations of the
German philosopher, and Heidegger is also the basis of Kezilahabi’s theoriza-
tion of literature and literary criticism.
Kezilahabi based his critique of Western literary criticism on an incisive cri-
tique of essentialism. It is here that he is perhaps not well served by
Heideggerian philosophy. Heidegger himself, despite being an avowed “philoso-
pher of existence” (cf. Löwith 1991), did not resist the seductive power of essen-
tialism. On the political level, he notoriously fell for the ideology of Nazism in
the 1930s. However, essentialism also penetrates the philosophical level in
Heidegger’s thought.
Heidegger’s political involvement is well known and well documented
(Farías 1989, Wolin 1991, Ott 1993, Safranski 1998, Faye 2009). He was
appointed rector of Freiburg University in 1933 and became “a zealous propa-
gandist on behalf of the new regime in its initial stages” (Wolin 1991: 2). He
was a member of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP)
from 1933 until 1945. He sympathized with extreme-right attitudes, but he even-
tually distanced himself from Hitler because he felt contempt for the vulgarity of
the Nazi party. After the Second World War, and following the denazification
phase (1946–49), he was readmitted to the university in 1950–51 and was
made emeritus.
His sympathy for Nazism was motivated by the belief that “National
Socialism possessed the capacity to initiate a great spiritual renewal of
German Dasein” (Wolin 1991: 2). It had the potential to reverse the spiritual
decline of Europe, first voiced by Friedrich Nietzsche and later theorized by con-
servative philosophers such as Oswald Spengler, Ludwig Klages, and Ernst
Jünger. Heidegger considered his political commitments “as of a piece with
his philosophy” (Wolin 1991: 4): his support of National Socialism in 1933
was a “decision for authenticity” (ibid.). The conceptual framework of
Heidegger’s magnum opus, Being and Time (1927), not only “proved readily
compatible” (Wolin 1991: 5) with Nazism, but Nazism, according to
Emmanuel Faye, “inspired [Heidegger’s] works in their entirety and nourished
them at the root level” (Faye 2009: 6–7). Indeed, Heideggerian philosophy
shares the same premises as Nazism, and exhibits common salient features.
These include nationalism, with its appeal to Grund und Boden (“rootedness
of existence”, “soil”, see Heidegger 1996: §25), and its determinism by birth,
seeing Germans as the central pillars of Western culture; irrationalism,
rather different question, however, is how the translation of philosophical concepts into
Swahili contributes to their recontextualization and reinterpretation in another cultural
context. The resulting philosophy may, in one way or another, concur with trends of
Western philosophy (for instance, existentialism); yet, it is distinctly African in the
sense of deriving meaning from an African cultural context. At the same time, “distinctly
African” should not be read in an essentialist sense: there are many such “African con-
texts” and many such “distinctly African philosophies”.
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emphasizing the deep, hidden reality, and the insufficiency of critical reason in
uncovering this reality; and the rejection of individuality and democracy (Kohák
1995).
Nation is not a name for a group of people assembled through historical con-
tingency but for a biological fact: the nation is an organism of which individuals
are members. Nationalism is based on the belief in a deep determination of
“nation”: some nations are creators of culture (Germans), others destroy culture
(Jews, Roma, Slavs). There is no possibility of a conscious decision to become a
member of a nation: a Jew cannot decide to be German. “Der Jude kann nur
jüdisch denken. Schreibt er deutsch, dann lügt er. Der Deutsche, der deutsch
schreibt, aber jüdisch denkt, ist ein Verräter”,3 said the anti-Semitic pamphlet
of the German Student Union (Deutsche Studentenschaft) published in 1938
by Ernst Forsthoff alongside excerpts from Heidegger’s Rectorship Address
(Rektoratsrede, titled “The Self-Assertion of the German University”). The pub-
lication of the Rektoratsrede on pages mirroring this declaration is telling, as
Heidegger’s impassioned speech is fully consonant with such nationalist posi-
tions. His strongly anti-Semitic opinions were fully revealed in the recent pub-
lication of his Black Notebooks from 1931–45, and he also firmly believed in the
special genius of the German people. In the Rectorship Address, he speaks of
“the inexorability of that spiritual mission which impresses onto the fate of
the German Volk the stamp of their history” (Heidegger 1991: 29) and of
“the will to the historical spiritual mission of the German Volk as a Volk that
knows itself in its state” (1991: 30). This “spiritual mission” means that “for
Europe itself [Germany’s] historical Dasein proves to be the center”, as
Heidegger claimed in 1935 (Heidegger 2000: 44). As late as 1943 he writes
that “only from the Germans can there come a world-historical reflection – if
. . . they can find and preserve their ‘Germanness’ (‘das Deutsche’)” (quoted
in Wolin 1991: 14).
To Hitler, the nation is mystical reality, a connection by blood. Intuition is a
higher degree of recognition in comparison with mere rationality. Heidegger’s
philosophy is also an intuitive, emotive search for the true meaning of phenom-
ena, which is hidden in everydayness. Argument is not the right method of phil-
osophy, it is rather opening up and securing an extra-rational access to truth
through “listening to Being”: “Da-sein’s thinking is a listening to Being’s self-
disclosure” (Zeytinoglu 2011: 277). On account of such formulations, Wolin
likens Heidegger’s philosophical style to “that of a prophet who views himself
as standing in a position of immediate access to Being” (1991: 11).
It is on the basis of such experience that Heidegger introduces two concepts
“inauthenticity” as escaping our fundamental possibilities and “authenticity” as
the opening up of consciousness to the human situation, to life in confrontation
with one’s own finitude: (“Being-unto-Death”). The mystical access to “Being”
makes of truth a gift of disclosedness and unveiling (aletheia). Faye points out
that the “radicalism of the pure decision on the part of an existent facing noth-
ingness, which no rational motive can support nor any warning of its destructive
3 “A Jew can only think in a Jewish way. If he writes in German, then he is lying. A
German who writes German but thinks Jewish, is a traitor.” My translation.
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effects forestall, inhabits the very foundation of Nazism” (2009: 9). “The pure
decision in preparation for an ‘authentic’ existence, authorized only by itself,
[which] tends to deny all deliberation, all prudence, and eventually all real
thought” (ibid.), is equally at the very core of Heidegger’s philosophy in
Being and Time.
The rejection of democracy derives from the fact that democracy is based on
individualism, which, for Heidegger, is symptomatic of “a nihilistic Western
modernity” where “the self-enclosed, monadic individual has emerged as [the]
absolute point of reference [of politics]” (Wolin 1991: 7). This vulgar and sub-
jectivist “antithesis to the classical polis, in which the individual good was
always subordinated to the good of the whole” is to be overcome by “a new
heroic ethos” (ibid.). In this ideology the German nation has the historical role
of gaining power over the world (Griff nach der Weltmacht). War is the fulfilment
of its historical vocation. It was from the “community of destiny”
(Schicksalsgemeinschaft) and the “community of the people” (Volksgemeinschaft)
(see Faye 2009: 16) that Heidegger envisaged refuting “the philosophy of
human individuality and the Cartesian self” (Faye 2009: 9). As Faye argues,
Heidegger’s linguistic strategy, when he dropped the reference to the human
subject in favour of the term “Dasein”, enabled him a surreptitious substitution
of a philosophy of human individuality with that founded on a collective entity,
the Volk (Heidegger 1996: §§ 27 and 74).
Liaisons dangereuses
Kezilahabi interiorizes the essentialist foundations of Heidegger’s philosophy.
He upholds an essentialist concept of “African being”: “inauthenticity is . . .
identified with Western fragmentative thinking, while authenticity is defined
in terms of the African worldview as inherently disclosing of true being”
(Lanfranchi 2015: 179) and entertains “an essentialist notion of African authen-
ticity” (Lanfranchi 2015: 180), in identifying “the African experience [with] an
ontological form of consciousness tied to Being” (Kezilahabi 1985: 194).
Indeed, Kezilahabi draws a sharp distinction between the “techno-critic” and
“onto-critic”. While the former only acquires “knowledge” through objectifying
processes, the latter has an intimate access to truth and Being through “under-
standing”: “‘understanding’ has an area of overtones which ‘knowing’ can
never reach” (Kezilahabi 1985: 219).4 He categorically states:
A distinction can be made between the “language” of theory and the lan-
guage of thinking. The “language” of theory is grounded in technē, the
language of thinking in Being. The “language” of theory and knowing
demands accurate observation and accurate tools. The language of thinking
and understanding demands sensibility, attunement, immersion and medi-
tation without an intermediary or articulated discourse (Kezilahabi 1985:
219).
4 Kezilahabi reiterated his views during his lecture entitled “The real and the imaginary:
propellers of knowledge in literature” in the BIGSAS Denkatelier 03 at the University
of Bayreuth, on 26 May 2017.
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This passage shows the centrality of Kezilahabi’s notion of “language” (lugha,
in Swahili), and it also explains his understanding of the abolition of the subject/
object dichotomy, which is clearly formulated along Heideggerian lines:
“Understanding cannot be articulated through a theory of knowledge because
it is not based on communication. It is based on the language of Being”
(1985: 221).
For Kezilahabi, only an African has the capacity to become an onto-critic,
provided s/he extricates him/herself from Western theory; a foreigner can
never gain that special access to African being and truly understand African
literature:
. . . However much a foreign critic may try to understand the African
experience he will never get to the core because there is a difference
between knowing and understanding. There is always an infinite horizon
beyond articulated speech involved in understanding. That horizon
requires pre-knowledge and is deeply rooted in tradition (Kezilahabi
1985: 194–5).
Kezilahabi certainly presents a valid point here, referring to the hermeneutical
horizon of understanding (see below). The problem, however, is when he speaks
of “the core” and of “African experience”. What enables qualifying certain
experience as “African”? And what is “the core”? It is here that Kezilahabi’s lan-
guage becomes esoteric: he speaks of “leaps to primordial truth and belonging
without an intermediary” (1985: 216) as the way to access this “core”, whereby
this immediacy is only accessible to the “onto-critic” (i.e. an African), because
s/he “extends the domain of understanding beyond objectification and identifies
language with Being” (1985: 217). Understanding is characterized by an imme-
diacy of access to truth, an immediacy which knowledge replaces with the study
of ideas and the intermediary of theory and technology:
Briefly we may define understanding as the ability to project oneself upon
a possibility by way of the present without an intermediary, and knowing
as the ability to be acquainted with ideas, facts and concepts through actual
experience or given data (Kezilahabi 1985: 216).
The Heideggerian inspiration for Kezilahabi’s formulations is exceedingly clear:
“Onto-criticism seeks to rectify the decentralization of Being to the periphery by
theory through the reinstitution of ontology” (1985: 220) and it is “only possible
if language is treated as ‘disclosure,’ as an opening, as ‘the house of Being’”
(1985: 222).
Heidegger’s “authenticity” (Eigentlichkeit) secures a direct, unmediated
access to “Being”. It was precisely the concept of “authenticity”, however,
that was seen as problematic soon after its introduction into philosophy; it res-
titutes an essentialist concept of humanity. This aspect of Heidegger’s philoso-
phy was criticized by Jean-Paul Sartre in Being and Nothingness (1958), where
being becomes the emptiness of freedom.
Embracing the irrationalism of the Heideggerian concepts of Being and
authenticity, present in the intuition or disclosure of Being as truth (aletheia)
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and the determinism of (linguistic, national, racial. . .) privilege of that disclosure
to specific individuals, Kezilahabi strays into stark essentialism. Can we extri-
cate Kezilahabi from this enmeshment with the essentialism implicit in Martin
Heidegger’s philosophy and save his philosophical project from internal contra-
diction? More specifically, can we read Kezilahabi’s kuwako beyond the
Heideggerian dynamics of authenticity and Being?
I argue in the following that Kezilahabi saves his concept of kuwako from
these essentialist pitfalls precisely through “being destructive” to Western phil-
osophy. Part of this destruction is also the translation of philosophical concepts
into Swahili. But this only happens in Kezilahabi’s fictional writing, for it is here
that the translation has taken place. By contrast, Kezilahabi’s theoretical writ-
ings, mainly his doctoral thesis, were written in English and cannot profit
from this extra step. If the thesis can easily be classified as essentialist, despite
its proclamations to the contrary, the Swahiliphone novels are both more open-
ended and more intriguing.
3. Translation as destruction
African literary criticism has to take a destructive rather than a decon-
structive stand vis-à-vis the Western philosophy of value and representa-
tion (Kezilahabi 1985: 4, emphasis in bold added).
With clear echoes of Fanon, Kezilahabi boldly proclaims that African literature,
and by extension African philosophy as the understanding underpinning African
literature, must “do violence to all forms of codification and signification, all
forms of Western style and genres” (1985: 110). African philosophy must be
“destructive” to Western philosophy. The question that imposes itself here is:
is Kezilahabi destructive also to his “eye-openers”?
In the two novels, “violence” is done to Western philosophy in the scene of
destruction that is the dance competition at the end of Nagona, called Ngoma
Kuu (“Big dance”). Ngoma Kuu is an allegoric portrayal of the history of phil-
osophy. It presents four selected dances: Ngoma hizi zilikuwa ngoma mashuhuri
wakati fulani katika mkondo wa historia (these were famous dances at some
point in the course of history, 1990: 57). The first is a well-arranged dance of
songs such as De Anima, Politica, Metaphysica and De Poetica (1990: 58).
The second is a psychologist’s dance of songs such as Totem, Oedipus
Complex and Neurosis. Kezilahabi’s first eye-opener, Karl Marx, makes his
entry as the third group:
Ngoma ya tatu iliingia kwa kelele za “Chinja! Chinja!” Ngoma hii ilikuwa
ikiongozwa na mtu aliyejiita mwanamapinduzi na mtetezi wa wanyonge.
Wafuasi wake waliingia katika duara wakiimba wimbo wa kimapinduzi.
Kiongozi wao alikuwa amefuga madevu ya kutisha. “Babu huyu vipi!”
nilisikia mmoja kati ya watazamaji akisema. Kiongozi wao alinyoosha
usinga wake juu akatongoa nyimbo kuhusu maproletariati. Wafuasi wake
waliitikia kwa maneno yaliyohusu ubepari na usoshalisti. Walimalizia na
nyimbo zilizohusu mikinzano ya kitabaka na majilio ya usawa. Nilisikia
baadhi ya watazamaji wakisema, “Babu huyu anasema maneno ya busara.”
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Lakini alipoanza kuonyesha usinga wake kuelekea baadhi ya watu aliowaita
wanyonyaji hadharani, wafanyakazi wao walianza kumtupia mawe. Wakati
wao wa kuonyesha malimboto ulipowadia waliingia watu wenye njaa
wakimkatakata vipande mtu mmoja aliyeitwa bepari. Wakati huu waliimba
na kupiga kelele “Wafanyakazi wote ulimwenguni unganeni!” Nyimbo zao
zilijaa majuzuu na majuzuu, ilibidi waondolewe kwa nguvu kutoka katikati
ya duara maana walizidisha muda. Walikataa kutoka kitovuni wakidai
kwamba wakati wao wa kushika nafasi hiyo ulikuwa umewadia. Kila mtu
aliyewagusa walimwita mpinga mapinduzi. Walitolewa nje hali wakiimba
“A lutta Continua” (Kezilahabi 1990: 58–9).
The third dance came with shouts of “Slaughter! Slaughter!” This dance
was led by a man who called himself a revolutionary and a defender of
the weak. His followers entered the circle singing a revolutionary song.
Their leader had grown a fearsome beard. “Look at that old man!” I
heard someone in the audience say. Their leader straightened his flywhisk
over his head and then he sang songs about the proletariat. His followers
answered with words about capitalism and socialism. Eventually they sang
songs about class struggle and the coming of equality. I heard some people
in the audience saying, “This old man is speaking words of wisdom”. But
when he started pointing his flywhisk towards some people whom he pub-
licly called parasites, their workers started hurling stones at him. When
their time to show masterpiece tricks came, hungry people entered and
cut into pieces a person who was called a capitalist. At this time they
sang and shouted “Workers of the world, unite!” Their songs filled
volumes and volumes and they had to be removed from the centre of
the circle by force, because they exceeded their time. They refused to
leave the centre claiming that their time to hold that position had come.
Anyone who touched them was called a counter-revolutionary. They
were dragged out singing “A luta continua”.
Kezilahabi presents a scathing parody of Marxist ideology in this passage. Marx
is not only forcibly removed from the circle. He is replaced by the final group,
the group of madmen, who start dancing chaotically. Their dance overrides the
whole scene, millions of people are trampled to death and many others are
wounded.
Kezilahabi’s second eye-opener, Nietzsche, does not appear as a dancer in the
big dancing competition, but there is a clear allusion to him in the scene of a
tightrope walker who, unlike in the Nietzschean reading, fails his acrobatic
piece:
Tuliendelea kucheza kwa vurumai. Wakati wa malimboto ulipofika, ki-
ongozi wetu aliingia amepanda juu ya mgongo wa simba na juu angani
mwanasarakasi akawa anatembea juu ya uzi. Watu walishikilia roho zao.
Alipofika katikati aliteleza akaanguka chini. Alikufa palepale, lakini
hakuna aliyemjali. Tuliendelea kucheza kwa vurumai na baadhi ya wache-
zaji wetu walimkanyagakanyaga akasagika. Tulipiga kelele “Vurumai!”
(Kezilahabi 1990: 59).
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We continued dancing in chaos. When the time to show masterpiece tricks
came, our leader entered on top of a lion and up in the sky a circus per-
former started walking on a tightrope. People held their breath. When he
arrived in the middle, he slipped and fell down. He died on the spot,
but there was no one who bothered about him. We continued dancing in
chaos and some of our dancers stamped on him until he was crushed to
powder. We shouted: “Chaos!”.
Nietzsche, famously, presents the tightrope walker and lets Zarathustra philoso-
phize on the basis of this tableau:
Der Mensch ist ein Seil, geknüpft zwischen Thier und Übermensch, ein
Seil über einem Abgrunde. (Nietzsche, no date).
Man is a rope stretched between the animal and the Superman – a rope
over an abyss (Nietzsche 2008).
The rope, to Nietzsche, is humanity. That the tightrope walker fails to cross it,
and worse still, nobody even cares that he has been crushed to powder, equals an
annihilation of Nietzschean philosophy.
The chaotic dance leads to a mass destruction of humanity, humanity’s his-
tory and philosophy. This is instrumental to a radical reconfiguration of being
and knowledge after the destruction. The concluding passages of Mzingile pre-
sent an idyllic, paradise-like existence of a man (the protagonist) and a woman,
who live together in a state of innocence, playing like children all day. Animals
smile and eat grass, the lion grazing next to the zebra. All books have been
burnt, even the knowledge of fire has been forgotten, and the new humanity
invents a language that “does not distinguish between Man and Thing”, as we
have seen above, and that is based on pure existence. What has become of
the Heideggerian “Being” after vurumai, “chaos”, the act of destruction? And
what has become of “Being” through the act of translation into Swahili? We
must look at translation here.
Translation and hermeneutics
Translation is for Kezilahabi not a neutral act. This derives from his understand-
ing of hermeneutics and its foundation in language. Kezilahabi introduces the
term “horizon of the unsaid” (1985: 224) to refer to the Gadamerian “horizon
of understanding”. He explains: “The horizon of the unsaid is a circle of under-
standing which cannot simply be entered into by means of arbitrary chosen the-
ories of knowledge” (Kezilahabi 1985: 226). Kezilahabi links the “horizon of
the unsaid” to a theory of linguistic relativity: African languages are carriers
of African culture. Foreign languages “objectify [Africans’] views within
[their] signifying systems” and “push [them] to orchestrate peculiarities of
[their] own cultures”. As a result of this, African literature becomes “a literature
of odes to the exotica and vulgar anthropologism” and “a ‘phenomenology of
prostitution’” (Kezilahabi 1985: 359). This harsh criticism of conceptualizations
of African experience within foreign signifying systems, as in Europhone
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African literature, explains Kezilahabi’s effort to talk about Western philosophy
in African languages and to recontextualize the problems of Western philoso-
phy, which undeniably and inevitably affect Africa, within Afrophone intellec-
tual traditions. Challenging the “colonization of the mind” (Ngugi 1981) implicit
in the employment of European languages to express African realities,
Kezilahabi uses African words, with the semantics and the hermeneutical hori-
zons of these languages, to speak about philosophical concepts, including con-
cepts originating in the European tradition of philosophy. In this, Kezilahabi is
far more radical than Ngugi. The “suggestive power [of language] well beyond
the immediate and lexical meaning” (1981: 11), which differentiates the African
mother tongue from the adopted colonial language in Ngugi’s view, refers to the
level of connotative meanings of language. While Kezilahabi subsumes conno-
tative meanings under his concept of the “horizon of the unsaid”, he additionally
demonstrates that words that are apparent translations also have different denota-
tive meanings.
Kezilahabi translates “subject” and “object” as Mtu and Kitu.5 This transla-
tion rests on the structure of Bantu languages: the words belong to noun classes
existing in these languages and are related to other words in different classes.
Class 1 m(u)- mostly refers to people (e.g. mtu, “person, human being”), class
7 ki- mostly refers to things (kitu, “thing”), class 11/14 u- is the class of abstract
nouns (utu, “humanity”), etc. The structure of Bantu languages was famously
theorized as “Bantu philosophy” by Alexis Kagame. In his La philosophie
bantu-rwandaise de l’Être (1955), he identified four ontological categories
(compared to Aristotle’s ten): umuntu, abantu – intelligent being (Aristotle’s
substance); ikintu, ibintu – a being without intelligence, animals, plants (sub-
stance); ahantu – determination of time and space; ukuntu – modality (quantity,
quality, relation, activity, passivity, position, possession). In La philosophie
Bantu comparée (1976), Kagame expanded his view to include many Bantu lan-
guages and cultures to prove his point about a common philosophical under-
standing of the world among the Bantu,6 involving the four categories.
The reaction of Abdilatif Abdalla, a Kenyan poet and language expert as well
as a native speaker of Swahili firmly rooted in Swahili culture, to Kezilahabi’s
text is illustrative of the recontextualization of Western philosophy within a
Swahili, or even Bantu, conceptual framework. When asked about the meaning
of the passage in Kezilahabi’s novels, he immediately said the words Mtu and
Kitu were alluding to the Swahili proverb “mtu si kitu”, “a person is not a
thing”, i.e. a person must not be treated like a thing (personal communication,
July 2003). The proverb emphasizes the need to treat human beings with due
dignity and respect or, to use Kantian terminology, as “ends in themselves”
(although neither Abdalla nor Kezilahabi is explicitly referring to Kantian
5 It is very clear that Kezilahabi is speaking of “subject” and “object” in an epistemological
sense. The Swahili words for grammatical “subject” and “object” are kiima and shamir-
isho (see TUKI 1990, Massamba 2004).
6 The Bantu are ethnic groups inhabiting most of the African continent south of the
Equator. They speak some 400 closely related languages, including Swahili, Zulu,
Xhosa, Shona, etc. All Bantu languages share the basic grammatical structure involving
the characteristic system of noun classes, but they also have many common lexical items.
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practical philosophy here). The translated concepts feed into a new “horizon of
the unsaid”; they are recontextualized within another culture, in this case within
the Swahili philosophy of utu (see Rettová 2007). While Abdalla’s understand-
ing diverges from Kezilahabi’s use of Mtu and Kitu as translations of “subject/
object”, it connects Kezilahabi’s writings with an existing Swahili philosophical
discourse and conceptual framework, with the important implication of redefin-
ing an epistemological problem as a moral one. But there are yet more readings
that unfold through this cultural recontextualization. In the earlier passages of
Mzingile, humanity’s superiority over Nature is questioned in the discussions
between the main character and the scientist; the content of these discussions
is then summarized as referring to uhusiano uliopo kati ya Mtu na Kitu (“The
relationship that exists between Man and Thing”, Kezilahabi 1991: 52, see
also above). If Mtu and Kitu are also understood as Kagame’s categories of
being, the erasure of the boundary between Mtu and Kitu can be understood
as a negation of the ontological difference between “humans” and “non-
humans” (“things”, “Nature”). Nagona and Mzingile would then lend themselves
to topical environmentalist (posthumanist, ecocritical) readings (Rettová
forthcoming).
What is kuwako?
It is the translation of the Heideggerian concept of “Being” that is the real
enigma. Kezilahabi uses the Swahili word kuwako, the infinitive of locative
being, which means “to be present, to be here/there, to exist” or the appropriate
verbal nouns from these verbs. It is “being” in a locative sense. While kuwa
means “to be” (the root -wa is not a cognate of the copula ni, but it is used
as its infinitive), the -ko at the end has an almost identical meaning to that of
the German da- in dasein or Dasein: “to be present, to exist”. Kezilahabi’s sen-
tence, msingi wake ni kuwako (“its foundation is being”), does not make much
sense to a Swahili speaker unfamiliar with Heidegger: you never say ni kuwako
(“it is being”); kuwako is either used as an infinitive or conjugated with a per-
sonal prefix (e.g. niko “I am (here/somewhere)”).
Kuwako, therefore, is locative; “being” is transformed into “being-there”, Sein
into Dasein, esse into “existence”. Kwasi Wiredu, when talking about the
expression of “being” in Akan, says that “in Akan the concept of existence
has an explicitly locative connotation” (Wiredu 1996: 121); he uses this as an
argument in support of his suggestion that the existential, non-locative being
of the Cartesian cogito (derived from the Scholastic concept of the being of
God) would not make sense in Akan and is, perhaps, an “ontological fantasy”
(Wiredu 2002: 57). On the other hand, William Mkufya uses kuwa for the
being of God and of immaterial entities such as devils, as opposed to kuwako,
which pertains to human and other material beings (1999: 41 and 48). So it is
not the case that the distinction between “being” and “existence” is prima
facie impossible in Swahili.
I argue Kezilahabi is “destructive” also to Heidegger. On the one hand, he
destroys his third “eye-opener” through the act of violence, the chaotic dance
of philosophers which reshuffles the philosophical cards; on the other hand, sim-
ultaneously, and perhaps more radically, he is also destructive to Heidegger
through his translation of “Being” as kuwako. He reduces “Being” to a simple
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act of existing; this reading of “Being” does not even remotely match the
Heideggerian meaning of “Being”. The destructive approach helps Kezilahabi
abandon even his philosophical sources completely and go his own way.
There is one way to “salvage” kuwako – namely when it is what follows
upon destruction. Kezilahabi implements this destruction both on the level of
content (the destructive chaotic dance) and on the level of linguistic expression.
Kuwako is defined, on the one hand, through the locative meaning of the trans-
lated word and, on the other, through the fictional setting in which it is introduced:
it is the foundation of a new epistemology, of an ontological form of life, of the
overcoming of the subject-object dichotomy. It is a “rewriting”, “translating and
transferring” (Gaudioso 2015) of the Heideggerian concept of “Being” in the
sense of emptiness, openness, bare existence. Similar to Sartre,7 Kezilahabi is sug-
gesting that no positive fulfilment, no “authenticity” is possible but a total lack of
determination, which is the grounding of radical freedom. The scenes of destruc-
tion are significant because destruction has the role of reconfiguration. Chaos pre-
pares the ground for a new world. What remains is bare existence, emptiness as a
basis for self-projection and self-creation in freedom, for construction and casting
into existence. Then it also makes sense to speak of the silent language of being
and the absence of the subject-object duality.
Kuwako is the overcoming of categories of Being – overcoming beings – in
favour of bare existence. It is what follows upon destruction and upon the abo-
lition of the subject-object dichotomy. Kezilahabi’s understanding of Being is
thus existentialist, not essentialist. It is existence which escapes determinants
(such as “African” or “authentic”) and must be distinguished from “African
essence”, for which Kezilahabi coins the word “Quassia” (1985: 237 and pas-
sim) in his thesis. From this, truth for him is not unconcealment (aletheia) but
creation – this is at the basis of his “creative and projective” (Kezilahabi
1985: 195) literature. Essentialism is self-defeating if preceded by Vurumai!
(“Chaos!”), because kuwako is empty. It is not a content or an authenticity:
Vurumai! evacuates “Being”. Despite the obvious Heideggerian resonances
and assonances, Kezilahabi is taking the Heideggerian concept of “Being”,
which he renders in Swahili as kuwako, elsewhere.
4. Conclusion: projective literature, redemptive writing
Kezilahabi’s project has two parts: destruction and (re)construction. The destruc-
tive phase creates a discontinuity, it leaves nothing to represent; the new world is
built on the ruins of the old world, but it is not an emanation of the old. Then this
7 Kezilahabi does not reference Sartre in his thesis (1985). Among the sources of the exist-
entialist orientation of his early prose he mentions Beckett and Camus (Bernarder 1977:
49). Any influence of Sartre on Kezilahabi would have been indirect, the main connect-
ing link being Frantz Fanon. Kezilahabi read Fanon in Constance Farrington’s translation
(referenced in Kezilahabi 1985) which, according to Kathryn Batchelor (2015),
“de-philosophizes” Fanon and especially distances him from Sartre (cf. also Mazrui
2017). In view of the prominent role of “violence” and “destruction” in Kezilahabi
and in view of the dramatic shift in understanding “violence” on account of
Farrington’s translation (Batchelor 2015), the influence of Fanon on Kezilahabi would
merit a more focused discussion than can be delivered in this article.
T R A N S L A T I O N A S D E S T R U C T I O N 453
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0041977X18001003
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. SOAS - University of London, on 02 Nov 2018 at 14:29:18, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
lugha ambayo haina cha Mtu na Kitu can write the truly new, the future, the
possible. And then it does not represent but is reality. Bare existence becomes
the new foundation. The “language which does not contain the distinction
between Man and Thing” and “whose foundation is being” is the language of
a literature which abandons the mimetic link to the world. It rejects the reproduc-
tion of reality – which is the reality of a colonized/post-colonial continent – and
instead projects one of freedom. This literature projects an African future ex
nihilo, from the emptiness after destruction.
Kezilahabi makes his kuwako the foundation of a projective, emancipatory
writing. He therefore mainly connects it to literature, and then his redemptive
writing means literature which does not signify and have referents but which
is, which projects and makes rather than reproduces. But literature always has
an ontological meaning to Kezilahabi; it entails an existential project: the eman-
cipation of Africa. Writing becomes emancipatory because it does not portray
actuality but possibility and projects a new, “yet unimagined” future for
Africa and, indeed, for the whole of humanity. The step of “destruction” is rad-
ical enough to stop writing who we are and instead aspire to write who we are
not, who we possibly can be. The highly mystical language of Nagona and
Mzingile and the stylistic erasure of textual and narrative coherence corresponds
to this ambition. Euphrase Kezilahabi writes the future as not ensuing from the
present; the possible as not contained in or derived from the actual.
Kezilahabi’s work, in both the novels and the thesis, is not only critical of
Western epistemology; it also constructs a non-mimetic view of literature theor-
izing it beyond the category of representation and giving it an ontological mean-
ing: literature is a projection of (future/possible) reality. Kuwako remains an
emptiness. It is what issues from vurumai – the chaotic dance that destroys
and recreates, reconfigures being and knowledge.
An ironic post scriptum
While Kezilahabi’s thesis militates for an emancipated Africa and develops the
project of “creative and projective” (Kezilahabi 1985: 195) African literature, the
two novels, as I mentioned earlier, are both more open-ended and intriguing.
Kezilahabi ends Mzingile with a suggestion that perhaps the condition of radical
freedom and bare existence is unsustainable and untenable as a foundation of
life. The very last paragraph of the book reads:
Halafu, kwa bahati, nilipotazama kwa uangalifu chini ya kilima ni kama
niliona mzee akitambaa polepole kwa magoti kuelekea kileleni. Juu ya
mgongo wake, palikuwa na kitabu. Wanyama walikuwa wakicheka!
(Kezilahabi 1991: 70).
Finally, by accident, when I looked carefully under the hill, it was as
though I saw the old man crawling slowly on his knees towards the top.
On his back, there was a book. The animals were laughing!
The “old man” is the god-like figure in the novels and the book he is dragging
on his back can only be the single book that escaped the burning of all books
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when it one day mysteriously disappeared together with the old man. The book
is Das Kapital.
The ending of Mzingile is, thus, destructive also to the idea of freedom, emp-
tiness, and bare existence. The past is not erased and the future is predetermined.
Radical freedom is a utopia and another circle of human folly is about to begin,
with God and ideology resuming their position of power on top of the mountain.
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